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Abstract:  
This paper attempts to reveal the intangible components of wealth that need to be 
considered for further economic and social policies in Morocco. This objective is achieved 
through selecting secondary time series data and international indices and regressing the 
residual intangible wealth as measured by the World Bank method, on different components 
that are likely to be tested as genuine wealth indicators for Morocco. The attained results are 
not different from those revealed in previous publications. Governance, Intellectual capital 
besides Safety and Peace in addition to some cultural features appear to be the main 
components of the intangible wealth in Morocco. They consequently constitute new directions 
for economic policy improvements.  
Keywords: Intangible capital, regression analysis, wealth intangible components.  
JEL: O11, Q56, E21. 
 
Introduction 
At the microeconomic level, series of intangible assets and values could be easily 
identified and perceived as affecting the overall wealth of a firm, a household, an individual 
or community. But, the intangible wealth components are hard to capture and perceive at the 
macroeconomic level, unless taken as aggregates. Such wealth components could be built 
around factors such as trust, security, abilities and other amenities that are not captured in the 
tangible resources. The most important aggregates related to the intangible wealth of a nation 
and that are mostly cited in the literature account for social, intellectual, knowledge, human, 
cultural and institutional capitals with series of variations in their compositions and mainly 
their measurements.  
Furthermore, only an aggregate figure of intangible capital of a nation is obtained as a 
residual and difference between total and tangible wealth. While the tangible part is obtained 
as the net values of traded manufacturing and natural flows from goods and services of a 
nation, the total value of the wealth is the present value of the adjusted genuine wealth 
generated over the a long time horizon for an economy. Aggregate values for intangible have 
been obtained over time for series of nations.  
The question is then how to identify the major intangible factors that form the most 
dominant intangible component in Morocco. Does the obtained residual capture one or several 
components as perceived under culture, trust, safety, abilities, knowledge, governance and 
organization? 
The objective of the present paper is to introduce and test a way that could help reveal 
the major intangible components included in the overall estimation of the total intangible 
wealth. This helps in the setting of new economic policies that address sectors and the overall 
economy to enhance the level of intangible and thus the total wealth of Morocco.  
The achievement of the above objective will be mainly based on empirically analyzing 
the likely relationships between the computed total intangible wealth as residual and series of 
indices measuring variety of intangible assets. 
The present paper is composed of a literature review that addresses how the likely 
relationships have been discussed globally and in series of economies. This is followed by the 
presentation of the most important indices that have been developed to capture different 
intangibles. A methodological part is then introduced to address the procedure, the data and 
the hypotheses to be used to tackle the basic question of the paper. The last part focuses on the 
results and their discussion in relation to context of Morocco. 
 
I. Literature Review 
The effects of different intangible components of wealth on the economic performance 
have been discussed in series of publications. These include papers centered on the effects of 
trust, institutions, intellectual capital, safety, trust and other dimensions related human 
resources.   
McCracken, M. (1998) considers that culture is a set of ethical habits and reciprocal 
moral obligations internalized by members of each community. To the author, trust is related 
to dependability that members will follow the norms defined by the culture.  Social capital is 
then a capability that arises from the prevalence of trust in a society. This can range from the 
family to a nation, and is reflected in the adoption of a set of common norms. Social cohesion 
relates to the notion of “glue” or “linkages” between people.  
The common starting point for economics is the individual, with tastes taken as given, 
with given characteristics which are often lumped together into the concept of human capital. 
The stock of human capital is augmented by education, informal and formal training, and 
experiences. Human capital is taken as the explanation for differential incomes among people. 
The author refers then to better economic performance improves social cohesion, particularly 
as gains are shared among the economic partners and social programs.  To the author, there is 
growing evidence that there is a strong causal linkage from social cohesion to macroeconomic 
performance. Channels through which an improvement in social cohesion (social capital) can 
impact macroeconomic performance, directly and indirectly include reduced transaction costs 
as trust between organizations and people allows for transactions to take place with high 
confidence that payments will be made, and higher investment ratio as an increase in the 
investment ratio as a result of greater trust and more credible policies can influence the long-
term growth prospects of the nation by raising the rate of productivity growth. In addition, 
encouragement of innovation - more entrepreneurial time available for innovation and better 
performance of government institutions, lead to increases in education, enhanced provision of 
public goods, and better public policy.  
When considering culture only, Casson (2006) insists on its nature as an economic 
asset and a form of cultural capital. It is an intangible public good, shared by the members of 
a social group. The author has shown that the influence of culture on the economy extends 
well beyond the production and consumption of cultural goods. Values and beliefs of a 
suitable kind can improve economic performance. The high-performance culture also 
encourages both freedom and responsibility. In addition, a moral culture will rely on trust to 
as much as possible, but will underpin trust by the rule of law. 
Chiu (1998) shows that greater income equality implies higher human capital 
accumulation and economic performance in an overlapping-generations model with 
heterogeneity in income and talent. Given liquidity constraints and declining marginal utility, 
individuals with a given level of talent receive education if their initial income is higher than a 
threshold level and the threshold is lower for more talented individuals. Assuming the more 
talented create more human capital when educated, greater initial income equality for one 
generation then imply not only higher aggregate human capital accumulated by that 
generation but an improvement in all subsequent generations' initial income distributions. 
Beugelsdijk, De Grooty, and Van Schaikz (2004) analyze the robustness of results on 
the relationship between growth and trust previously derived by other authors. They show that 
the results of Knack and Keefer are only limitedly robust, whereas those of Zak and Knack 
are highly robust in terms of significance of the estimated coefficients and reasonably robust 
in terms of the estimated effect size. The improvement in robustness is caused by the 
inclusion of countries with relatively low scores on trust (most notably, the Philippines and 
Peru). Overall, our results point at a relatively important role for trust. However, the answer to 
the question how large this payoff actually is depends on the set of conditioning variables 
controlled for in the regression analysis and—to an even larger extent—on the underlying 
sample. 
On social capital, Nannestad, Tinngaard and Sonderskov (2013) look at the 
determination of trust in a society and to the quality of levels of social trust, migrants from 
countries with lower-quality institutions should enhance their level of social trust in countries 
with higher-quality institutions. If, on the other hand, the migrants’ level of social trust is 
determined by their culture, it should not be affected by a different institutional setting. 
Furthermore, culturally diverse immigrant groups should have different levels of social trust 
in the same host country. Analyzing migration from several non-western countries to 
Denmark, this paper demonstrates that institutions rather than culture matter for social trust. 
Mishler and Rose (1997) focuses on trust in social and political institutions to find it 
vital to the consolidation of democracy, but in post-Communist Europe, distrust is the 
predicted legacy of Communist rule. Contrary to expectations, however, New Democracies 
Barometer surveys of popular trust in fifteen institutions across nine Eastern and Central 
European countries indicate that skepticism, rather than distrust, predominates. Although trust 
varies across institutions and countries, citizens trust holistically, evaluating institutions along 
a single dimension. Both early life evaluations influence levels of trust. The legacy of 
socialization under Communism has mostly indirect effects, whereas the effects of economic 
and political performance evaluations on trust are larger and more direct. Thus, skepticism 
reflects trade-offs between public dissatisfaction with current economic performance, 
optimism about future economic performance, and satisfaction with the political performance 
of contemporary institutions in providing greater individual liberties than in the Communist 
past.  
Letki (2006) considers that in the last decade considerable research in social sciences 
has focused on interpersonal trust, treating it as a remedy for most maladies modern 
democracies suffer from. Yet, if others act dishonestly, trust is turned into gullibility, thus 
mechanisms linking interpersonal trust with institutional success refer implicitly to honesty 
and civic morality. This paper investigates the roots of civic morality. It applies hierarchical 
models to data from 38 countries, and tests the individual, community and structural 
explanatory factors. The results of the analysis point to the relevance of an institutional 
dimension, both in the form of individuals' perceptions as well as the quality of governance: 
confidence in political institutions and their objective quality are the strongest predictors of 
civic morality. At the same time, the findings show that the recently popular claims about the 
importance of social capital for citizens' moral standards are largely unfounded. 
Algan and Cahuc (2010) develop a new method to uncover the causal effect of trust on 
economic growth by focusing on the inherited component of trust and its time variation. The 
authors show that inherited trust of descendants of US immigrants is significantly influenced 
by the country of origin and the timing of arrival of their forebears. This strategy allows to 
identify the sizeable causal impact of inherited trust on worldwide growth during the 
twentieth century by controlling for country fixed effects.  
Camacho (2014) insists on a comprehensive theory of support to democracy. Building 
on instrumental and cultural approaches, the theory argues that experience with democracy 
conditions the extent to which economic and political performance inform support. The 
evidence from 21 Latin American countries indicates that both economic and political 
performance inform support for democracy and that the extent to which economic 
performance informs and supports declines as a democracy grows older. 
Knack and Keefer (2010) compare more direct measures of the institutional 
environment with both the instability proxies used by Barro (1991) and the Gastil indices 
(2000), by comparing their effects both on growth and private investment. The results provide 
substantial support for the position that the institutional roots of growth and convergence are 
significant. The improvement is that these new variables represent over existing proxies. It 
also suggests that there are substantial returns to future research into variables that reflect the 
security of property rights and the efficiency with which states determine economic policies 
and allocate public goods. 
Hamilton and Liu (2013) emphasize the importance of human capital in total wealth. 
They estimate the value of human capital using the lifetime income approach for a sample of 
13 (mostly high-income) countries. This yields a mean share of human capital in total wealth 
of 62 percent—four times the value of produced capital and 15 times the value of natural 
capital. But for selected high-income countries in the sample there is still an average of 25 
percent of total wealth that is unaccounted—it is neither produced, nor natural, nor human 
capital. This residual intangible wealth is arguably the “stock equivalent” of total factor 
productivity—the value of assets such as institutional quality and social capital that augment 
the capacity of produced, natural and human capital to support a stream of consumption into 
the future. 
World Bank (2006) and mainly in Chapter 7 focusing on Explaining the Intangible 
Capital Residual with insistence on the role of Human Capital and Institutions in total wealth 
of a nation, regression analysis is recommended to identify the major determinants of the 
intangible capital residual with human capital given an important part of any model 
specification. A proxy for human capital is schooling. Schooling level per person constitutes 
an imperfect measure of human capital, since it does not take into account the quality of 
education of those trained, nor other types of human capital investment such as on-the-job 
training. For institutional capital the model uses the rule of law indicator. It encompasses the 
respect of citizens and the state for the institutions which govern their interactions. While 
there is no strong reason to prefer one governance dimension over another, an argument in 
favor of choosing the rule of law indicator is that it captures particularly well some of the 
features of a country’s social capital.  
Cobb (2008) focuses on the above study and emphasizes the role of regression 
analysis to quantify the contribution of the ‘intangibles’ mainly the value of social institutions 
and education with social capital explaining 57 percent of the intangible residual and 
education accounting for 43 percent of intangible wealth. Under this analysis it is fair to say 
that roughly half of intangible wealth is attributable to education and half is attributable to 
social capital. This disaggregation and quantification of intangibles provides a useful 
paradigm for policymakers particularly when undertaking the cost-benefit analysis of a given 
policy. 
Ferreira and Hamilton (2010) estimate total wealth, natural capital, and physical 
capital for a panel of countries to shed light on the constituents of the intangible capital 
residual. The authors show that factors of production are very successful in explaining the 
variation in output per worker when they use intangible capital instead of human capital as a 
factor of production. This suggests that intangible capital captures a broad range of assets 
typically included in the total factor productivity residual. Human capital is an important 
factor, both in statistical and economic terms, in regressions decomposing intangible capital. 
All the above papers suggest intangible wealth components that include governance, 
culture, peace, trust and stability among others. Different indices have been developed to 
capture series of dimensions not included in the tangible part of the wealth of nations. They 
are reviewed below with the objective of selecting those that might pertain to the Moroccan 
economy.  
II. Indices for Intangible Wealth 
Different forms and types of capitals have been considered and developed under 
different social science disciplines and across subjects. Human, intellectual, knowledge, social 
and institutional capitals have all been described and assessed for countries and groups of 
economies. They include also social, health and knowledge capitals (Driouchi, 2013). Also, 
series of indices have been generated to account for variations of levels of prosperity and 
enjoyments in different economies. Besides variety of indices related to happiness and life 
satisfaction, there have been attempts to account for genuine progress and sustainably.This 
section reviews most of the indices that are likely to account for intangible wealth and for 
applications to Morocco. While the first two indices appear to be relevant for the 
characterization of intangible wealth, they are only mentioned here, and will not be used in 
the following analysis because they are too recent or do not have enough observations. Those 
that will be used in the analysis are introduced under heading number 3. 
1. The Social Progress Index (SPI) 
One of the most recent indices that account for both tangible and intangibles is the 
Social Progress index (http://www.socialprogressimperative.org/data). The Index is the sum 
of three dimensions: Basic Human Needs, Foundations of Wellbeing, and Opportunity. Each 
dimension is made up of four equally weighted individual components scored on an objective 
scale from 0–100. This scale is determined by identifying the best and worst global 
performance on each indicator by any country in the last 10 years, and using these to set the 
maximum (100) and minimum (0) bounds. 
Morocco SPI 2014 shows that the country does best in areas including Nutrition and 
Basic Medical Care but has the greatest opportunity to improve human wellbeing by focusing 
more on Water and Sanitation. Under the Foundations of Wellbeing Dimension, Morocco 
excels at providing building blocks for people's lives such as Access to Basic Knowledge but 
would benefit from greater investment in Ecosystem Sustainability. Of issues covered by the 
Opportunity Dimension, Morocco outperforms in providing opportunities for people to 
improve their position in society and scores highly in Personal Freedom and Choice yet falls 
short in Access to Advanced Education. Social Progress Index  58.01, Basic Human Needs 
71.86 Nutrition and Basic Medical Care 87.74  Water and Sanitation  54.56 Shelter 76.18 
Personal safety  68.95 Foundations of Wellbeing  62.57, Access to Basic Knowledge 76.68,  
Access to Information and Communications 63.71 , Health and Wellness  75.37 , Ecosystem 
Sustainability  34.54, Opportunity  39.60, Personal Rights 41.60, Personal Freedom and 
Choice 64.82, Tolerance and Inclusion 37.61 and Access to Advanced Education 14.37.  
2. World Value Surveys 
Values have been assessed within the framework of World Value Surveys from which 
data related to Morocco are retrieved (WV4_Data_Morocco_2001_spss_v_2014-04-28.zip). 
They show that family, work and social values have been equally important in 2001 and 2007 
as they provide intangible satisfaction to individuals, families and communities. But, 
interpersonal values such as those related to trust are not as high as for other countries for the 
same period.  
 
Total 
Sex Age 
 Male Female NA Up to 29 30-49 
50 and 
more 
No Answer 
Most people can be 
trusted 
23.0 19.8 26.2 - 23.0 19.3 30.9 - 
Need to be very careful 73.4 75.5 71.4 100.0 73.9 77.4 64.1 100.0 
Don’t know 3.5 4.7 2.3 - 3.1 3.3 5.0 - 
(N) (1251) (620) (630) (1) (488) (513) (247) (2) 
Source: World Values Survey Morocco 2001 
 
Table 1: Results of a question about the trusting attitude in Morocco by sex and categories of age 2001 
The sample studied is composed of 1251 persons from both genders starting 18 years 
old. The results show that 73.4% of the total number surveyed thinks that one need to be very 
careful in dealing with people while 23% think that most of people can be trusted. The 
questionnaire was Concerning Morocco73.4% of the surveyed people estimate that people 
need to be very careful when dealing with people. For the 620 males and 630 females 
surveyed 75.5% of the males think they need to be careful in dealing with people against 
71.4% of females. The females scored higher percentage with 26.2% of females for 19.8% of 
males that think that most people can be trusted. The sample was then classified for three 
categories of age 488 people aged up to 29 years old, 513 people between 30 and 49 years old 
and 247 people aged 50 and more. 77.4% of the people aged between 30-49 years old think 
that people need to be very careful in dealing with people followed by 73.9% for people aged 
up to 29 years old and by 64.1 for those aged 50 and more. On the other hand, the category of 
age of 50 years and more scored 30.9% of people thinking that most of people can be trusted 
followed by the 23% for people aged up to 29 and then 19.3% for those aged 30 to 49years 
old. 
 
Total 
Sex Age 
 Male Female Up to 29 30-49 50 and more No Answer 
Most people can be trusted 12.8 12.3 13.2 10.3 11.9 18.4 - 
Need to be very careful 85.3 86.5 84.2 87.7 86.5 79.2 100.0 
Don’t know 1.9 1.2 2.6 2.0 1.5 2.4 - 
(N) (1200) (592) (608) (495) (453) (250) (2) 
        Source: World Values Survey Morocco 2007 
Table 2: Results of a question about the trusting attitude in Morocco by sex and categories of age, data 2007 
For the questionnaire of 2007, the surveyed sample was 1200 people from both gender 
and older than18 years old. From the total number of people surveyed 85.3% estimated that 
one need to be careful in dealing with people. This percentage increases by 11.9 from the one 
recorded in 2001. While the percentage of people that think that most people can be trusted 
decreased by about half from 23% in 2001 to 12.8%. Among the 592 males and the 608 
females surveyed 86.5% of the males while 84.2 of the females think that one need to be very 
careful in dealing with people. These numbers increased by 11% for males and 13.8% for 
females from the one noted in 2001. Regarding the age categories, people aged up to 29 years 
old takes the lead with 87.7% thinking that one need to be very careful in dealing with people 
followed by people aged between 30 to 49 years old (86.5%) and then those aged above 50 
years (79.2%). People aged up to 29 years old become more careful in dealing with people 
compared to 2001. These results are also reflected in the results of people that believe that 
most of people can be trusted. 
 
Total 
Sex Age 
 Male Female Up to 29 30-49 50 and more No Answer 
Trust Completely 89.1 89.2 89.0 91.1 87.9 87.2 100.0 
Somewhat  10.0 10.0 10.0 8.5 11.0 11.2 - 
Not very much 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.4 1.2 - 
No trust at all 0.1 0.2 - - 0.2 - - 
No answer 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.4 - 
(N) (1200) (592) (608) (495) (453) (250) (2) 
         Source: World Values Survey Morocco 2007 
Table 3: How much one trusts family for different categories 2007 
Results of the survey show that people trust completely the members of their families 
at 89.1% followed by 10% that believe them somewhat and a slight percentage 0.5% and 
0.1% that do not trust them very much of not at all respectively. The gender does not affect 
the degree of trust put in the family members. However, the degree of trust varies slightly 
following the age category. The results show that people tend to trust more those aged up to 
29 years old (91.1%) followed by the categories of age between 30 and 49 years old and 
people aged more than 50 years old in equal percentages 87.9% and 87.2%.On the other hand, 
people trust somewhat members of their families aged more than 30 years old at about 11% 
for both categories.    
         Source: World Values Survey Morocco 2007 
Table 4: How much one trust people from the neighborhood for different categories 2007 
About half (47.9%) of people surveyed claim they trust completely people from their 
neighborhood. The majority of the other half (36.2%) trust people of their neighborhood 
somewhat. On the other hand, 11.4% do not trust very much people from their neighborhood. 
The gender does not affect these percentages as they are equal for males and females. 
However, people do not trust at all males from their neighborhood (5.4%) more than females 
(3%). The degree of trust varies related to the categories of age. People tend to trust 
completely those aged 50 and more from their neighborhood (53.6%) this is followed by those 
aged up to 29 years old (47.9%). Individuals trust somewhat (39.1%) those from their 
neighborhood and aged between 30 and 49 years old.  
         Source: World Values Survey Morocco 2007 
Table 5: How much one trust people one knows personally for different categories 2007 
 
Total 
Sex Age 
 Male Female Up to 29 30-49 50 and more No Answer 
Trust Completely 47.9 47.5 48.4 47.9 44.6 53.6 100.0 
Somewhat  36.2 35.6 36.7 35.6 39.1 32.4 - 
Not very much 11.4 11.1 11.7 11.5 11.7 10.8 - 
No trust at all 4.2 5.4 3.0 4.6 4.2 3.2 - 
No answer 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 - - 
(N) (1200) (592) (608) (495) (453) (250) (2) 
 
Total 
Sex Age 
 Male Female Up to 29 30-49 50 and more No Answer 
Trust Completely 36.8 37.3 36.0 36.6 34.9 40.4 100.0 
Somewhat  40.0 39.0 41.0 41.0 41.3 36.0 - 
Not very much 18.3 18.4 18.3 17.2 19.9 18.0 - 
No trust at all 3.8 3.5 3.9 3.2 3.8 4.8 - 
No answer 1.1 1.4 0.8 2.0 0.2 0.8 - 
(N) (1200) (592) (608) (495) (453) (250) (2) 
         The overall results of the survey show that the majority (40%) of people trust 
somewhat those they know personally, another 36.8% trust them completely. However, 
18.3% prefer not to trust very much people they know personally and 3.8% prefer not to trust 
them at all. The gender does not affect these percentages; however, the age category makes a 
difference. Among those they know personally and trust somewhat, people prefer those aged 
up to 29 years old (41%) and those aged between 30 and 49 years old (41.3%). Moreover, 
people trust completely (40.4%) those aged 50 and more among those they know personally.  
         Source: World Values Survey Morocco 2007 
Table 6: How much one trust those met for the first time for different categories 2007 
Regarding people one meets for the first time, the overall results show that the 
majority with a 44.8% chooses not to trust them very much, 32.6% chooses not to trust them 
at all and 19.2% prefers to trust them somewhat. The gender does not affect the percentages 
for each category; however the categories of age present some preferences. For people aged 
up to 29 years old, one do not trust them very much (47.3%), 29.9% do not trust them at all 
and 19.6% trust them somewhat. On the other hand, the surveyed individuals (43.7%) do not 
trust very much those aged between 30 to 49 years old and others (34.2%) do not trust them at 
all. For those aged 50 and more 41.6% chose not to trust them very much and 35.2% chose 
not to trust them at all.   
         Source: World Values Survey Morocco 2007 
Table 7: How much one trust people from another religion for different categories 2007 
For those from a different religion, the overall results show that 43.2% do not trust 
them very much, 31.2% prefer not to trust them at all and only 20.5% choose to trust them 
somewhat. Gender does not affect the degree of trust one puts on someone from a different 
religion. Males and females scored the same percentage for each degree of trust toward people 
 
Total 
Sex Age 
 Male Female Up to 29 30-49 50 and more No Answer 
Trust Completely 1.2 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2 - 
Somewhat  19.2 19.9 18.4 19.6 18.3 19.6 50.0 
Not very much 44.8 44.1 45.4 47.3 43.7 41.6 50.0 
No trust at all 32.6 32.4 32.7 29.9 34.2 35.2 - 
No answer 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.0 2.4 2.4 - 
(N) (1200) (592) (608) (495) (453) (250) (2) 
 
Total 
Sex Age 
 Male Female Up to 29 30-49 50 and more No Answer 
Trust Completely 1.2 1.4 1.0 1.6 1.1 - 50.0 
Somewhat  20.5 20.6 20.4 22.4 21.9 14.4 - 
Not very much 43.2 43.9 42.6 46.5 40.6 42.0 - 
No trust at all 31.2 30.7 31.6 26.9 31.6 38.8 50.0 
No answer 3.9 3.4 4.4 2.6 4.9 4.8 - 
(N) (1200) (592) (608) (495) (453) (250) (2) 
from another religion. Concerning the age categories, the 46.5% do not trust very much 
people from another religion and aged up to 29 years old, 40.6% chose not to trust very much 
those aged between 30 and 49 years old and 31.6% choose not to trust them at all. For those 
aged 50 and more, 42% of the surveyed individuals choose not to trust them very much while, 
38.8% choose not to trust them at all. 
         Source: World Values Survey Morocco 2007 
 
Table 8: How much one trust people from another nationality for different categories 2007 
The results of the surveyed individuals show that 44.1% do not trust very much people 
from another nationality and 31.6% do not trust them at all. On the other hand, only 18.8% 
would trust somewhat someone from another nationality but 1.8% chose to trust them 
completely. The gender does not affect the percentages very much and do not vary from the 
overall percentage described earlier. The difference in the percentages for each degree of trust 
between males and females is 3.3% for those who do not trust them at all and 2% in the other 
categories. However, the surveyed individuals show discrepancies in the degree of trust they 
put on a person following the age. People do not trust very much at 46.9% and 44.2% people 
from another nationality aged up to 29 years old and those from 30 to 49 years old. On the 
other hand, the revealed that people aged 50 and more and from another nationality are not 
trusted at all (40.2%).  
The benefits from the other existing indices are related to the length of their series 
covering more years. These indices related to knowledge, intellectual, social and governance 
are reviewed in this section. But most of the above indices are either very recent or have few 
data points that would limit the scope of the time-series analysis. 
3. Data and Indices used in the analysis 
The following table summarizes all the indices used in the analysis. They have the 
benefit of time length even if some of them has limited number of years. More details about 
each index are introduced in table 9.
 
Total 
Sex Age 
 Male Female Up to 29 30-49 50 and more No Answer 
Trust Completely 1.8 2.0 1.6 2.2 1.8 0.8 50.0 
Somewhat  18.8 19.8 17.8 21.2 18.3 14.8 - 
Not very much 44.1 45.1 43.1 46.9 44.2 38.8 - 
No trust at all 31.6 29.9 33.2 26.9 31.8 40.4 50.0 
No answer 3.8 3.2 4.3 2.8 4.0 5.2 - 
(N) (1200) (592) (608) (495) (453) (250) (2) 
Table 9: Indices used in the analysis
Variable Code Variable name Scale Years Available Source of the Data Link to Data 
Int. Wealth Intangible Wealth  1995 to 2013   
CPI Corruption 
Perception Index 
 1998 to 2014 except 
2001 
Transparency International http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results#myAnchor1  
KEI Knowledge 
Economy Index 
 1995, 2000, 2007, 
2008, 2012 
Worldbank Data http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page5.asp  
KI Knowledge Index  1995, 2000, 2007, 
2008, 2012 
Worldbank Data http://info.worldbank.org/etools/kam2/KAM_page5.asp  
AYS Average Years of 
Schooling 
 1995 to 2014 Barro and Lee Database http://www.barrolee.com/data/dataexp.htm  
EPI Environmental 
Performance Index 
from 1 to 100 2000 to 2014 Columbia University  http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/set/epi-environmental-performance-index-pilot-trend-
2012  
Failed State Failed State Index  2006 to 2014 The failed State Index http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings  
GII Global Innovation 
Index 
 2007 to 2014 Worldbank Data  
Trust Trust  2007   
Voice Acc. Voice Accoutability weak (-2.5) and 
Strong (2.5) 
1995 to 2013 The worldwide governance indicators http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports  
P. Stability Political Stability no 
violence 
weak (-2.5) and 
Strong (2.5) 
1995 to 2013 The worldwide governance indicators http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports  
Gov. Effectiv Government 
Effectiveness 
weak (-2.5) and 
Strong (2.5) 
1995 to 2013 The worldwide governance indicators http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports  
Reg. Quality Regulatory Quality weak (-2.5) and 
Strong (2.5) 
1995 to 2013 The worldwide governance indicators http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports  
Rule of Law Rule of Law weak (-2.5) and 
Strong (2.5) 
1995 to 2013 The worldwide governance indicators http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports  
Cont. Corrupt. Control of 
Corruption 
weak (-2.5) and 
Strong (2.5) 
1995 to 2013 The worldwide governance indicators http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports  
Status Ind. Status Index low value bad index 2003, 2006, 2008, 
2010, 2012, 2014 
The Bertelsmann Stiftung’s 
Transformation Index (BTI)  
http://www.bti-project.org/index/status-index/  
HDI Human 
Development Index 
 1995, 1997, 2000, 
2002, 2005 to 2008 
and 2010 to 2013 
UNDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/data  
Glob. Peace 
Index 
Global Peace Index  2008 – 2014 Vision of Humanity http://www.visionofhumanity.org/#page/indexes/global-peace-index/2009/MAR/OVER  
Social Cap. Social Capital  low values lead to 
weak ranking 
from 2009 to 2014 Legatum Prosperity Index http://www.prosperity.com/#!/  
Personal Freed. Personal Freedom low values lead to 
weak ranking 
from 2009 to 2014 Legatum Prosperity Index http://www.prosperity.com/#!/  
Safety & 
Security 
Safety and Security low values lead to 
weak ranking 
from 2009 to 2014 Legatum Prosperity Index http://www.prosperity.com/#!/  
III. Method and Analysis 
The method pursued here follows that of World Bank (2006) and Hamilton and Liu 
(2013) mainly through the use of school attainment for human capital, the rule of law, trust 
and others. The main method used is regression with instantaneous and lagged variables as:  
 
 Is retained in the regression if and only if it has a significant t-statistic; m is the 
greatest lag length for which the lagged dependent variable is significant. 
Next, the auto-regression is augmented by including lagged values of x: 
 
One retains in this regression all lagged values of x that are individually significant 
according to their t-statistics, provided that collectively they add explanatory power to the 
regression according to an F-test  
This is achieved through running unrestricted and restricted regressions between each 
two couple of variables that are found to have enough observations and that represent 
respectively governance, knowledge, peace, culture and other intangibles. The dependent 
variable used in all regressions in wealth. The data used are in Appendix 1. 
It is recognized though that at least two limitations may affect the attained results. The 
first one is directly related to the number of variables while the second is the length of the 
time series.  
 
IV. Results and Discussion 
Given the length of the series, it is not possible to include more explanatory variables 
in the same regression. The analysis is consequently conducted on a bivariate basis after 
checking that the series are stationary and for the correlations between explanatory variables 
(Appendix 2). The following results concern only the variables that exhibited a statistically 
significant coefficient with the dependent variable.  
Table 10 shows that the wealth series or the dependent variable is stationary and 
behaves as an autoregressive process of degree one (ARMA, 1). 
 
Dependent Variable: WEALTH   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/12/14   Time: 12:42   
Sample (adjusted): 2 18   
Included observations: 17 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     W_1 1.003413 0.030959 32.41090 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.462870    Mean dependent var 21.09351 
Adjusted R-squared 0.462870    S.D. dependent var 3.685627 
S.E. of regression 2.701166    Akaike info criterion 4.882267 
Sum squared resid 116.7408    Schwarz criterion 4.931279 
Log likelihood -40.49927    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.887139 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.039722    
     
     
Table 10: Wealth Process 
The results are respectively shown for governance, knowledge, peace, environment 
and culture. 
1. Governance Indicators 
According to Worldbank (2014), Worldwide Governance Indicators encloses six dimensions 
of governance:  Voice & Accountability, Political Stability and Lack of Violence,Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. Variables such as 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, voice and accountability appear to 
be affecting positively the intangible wealth. The respective results are shown in tables 11, 12, 
13 and 14. 
Dependent Variable: GOV__EFFECTIV  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/12/14   Time: 12:45   
Sample (adjusted): 2 18   
Included observations: 17 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     GE_1 0.848086 0.136480 6.213985 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.157018    Mean dependent var -0.098445 
Adjusted R-squared 0.157018    S.D. dependent var 0.074060 
S.E. of regression 0.067997    Akaike info criterion -2.481680 
Sum squared resid 0.073978    Schwarz criterion -2.432667 
Log likelihood 22.09428    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.476808 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.526040    
     
     
Table 11: Government Effectiveness 
 
Dependent Variable: REG__QUALITY  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/12/14   Time: 12:48   
Sample (adjusted): 2 18   
Included observations: 17 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
RQ_1 0.857721 0.127817 6.710515 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.082758    Mean dependent var -0.146943 
Adjusted R-squared 0.082758    S.D. dependent var 0.095819 
S.E. of regression 0.091768    Akaike info criterion -1.882079 
Sum squared resid 0.134743    Schwarz criterion -1.833066 
Log likelihood 16.99767    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.877207 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.454153    
     
     
Table 12: Regulatory Quality 
 
Dependent Variable: RULE_OF_LAW  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/12/14   Time: 12:49   
Sample (adjusted): 2 18   
Included observations: 17 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     RL_1 0.913767 0.093875 9.733886 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.847152    Mean dependent var -0.043887 
Adjusted R-squared 0.847152    S.D. dependent var 0.187872 
S.E. of regression 0.073450    Akaike info criterion -2.327401 
Sum squared resid 0.086318    Schwarz criterion -2.278388 
Log likelihood 20.78290    Hannan-Quinn criter. -2.322529 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.819669    
     
     
Table 13: Rule of Law 
 
Dependent Variable: WEALTH   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/12/14   Time: 13:14   
Sample (adjusted): 3 18   
Included observations: 16 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     RL_2 24.75663 6.975769 3.548946 0.0053 
     
     R-squared 0.142160    Mean dependent var 21.58630 
Adjusted R-squared -0.286760    S.D. dependent var 3.175829 
S.E. of regression 3.602517    Akaike info criterion 5.681139 
Sum squared resid 129.7813    Schwarz criterion 5.970860 
Log likelihood -39.44911    Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.695975 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.593329    
     
     
Table 14: Rule of Law lagged twice 
Dependent Variable: VOICE_ACC_  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/12/14   Time: 12:50   
Sample (adjusted): 2 18   
Included observations: 17 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     VA_1 1.002450 0.059109 16.95943 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.418505    Mean dependent var -0.605737 
Adjusted R-squared 0.418505    S.D. dependent var 0.197105 
S.E. of regression 0.150304    Akaike info criterion -0.895295 
Sum squared resid 0.361459    Schwarz criterion -0.846282 
Log likelihood 8.610007    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.890423 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.785359    
     
     
Table 15 : Voice and Accountability 
This shows how governance indicators and mainly « voice and accountability », « rule of 
law », “regulatory quality” and “government effectiveness” appear to be linked to intangible 
wealth. Any improvement in these measures will positively affect the total wealth.  
2. Knowledge 
This is represented by the average years of schooling with results shown in table 16. This 
variable is part of the Barro-Lee dataset that counts estimates from 1950 to 2010 in five years 
intervals. It measures the school attainment of individuals aged 25 years and above by sex and 
age. (Barro and Lee, 2014) 
 
Dependent Variable: WEALTH   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/12/14   Time: 15:15   
Sample (adjusted): 2008 2013   
Included observations: 6 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     AYS1 5.613847 0.392665 14.29680 0.0001 
     
     R-squared 0.186866    Mean dependent var 20.02806 
Adjusted R-squared -0.016418    S.D. dependent var 2.732494 
S.E. of regression 2.754833    Akaike info criterion 5.125792 
Sum squared resid 30.35642    Schwarz criterion 5.056379 
Log likelihood -13.37738    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.847924 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.988479    
 
Table 16: Average years of schooling 
This result shows how improvements in the average years of schooling (AYS) can enhance 
intangible wealth. Given the level of correlations between AYS, KEI, KI and GII, the AYS 
appears to be a measure of access to knowledge and innovation. It also refers to an important 
component of the intellectual capital.  
3. Environment 
According to Emerson, Esty, Levy, Kim, Mara, de Sherbinin, and Srebotnjak (2010), the 
Environmental Performance Index (EPI) variable measures the environmental 
performance of countries taking into consideration a number of variables. This variable 
addresses the efforts of country to reduce the environmental effects on health and the 
creation of a better ecosystem through a better management.  
The best results are shown in table 16 with the first lags of intangible wealth and that 
of the environmental performance index. 
 
Dependent Variable: W1   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/12/14   Time: 15:50   
Sample (adjusted): 2001 2013   
Included observations: 13 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     EPI1 1.683077 0.414690 4.058636 0.0019 
     
     R-squared 0.410997    Mean dependent var 22.40029 
Adjusted R-squared 0.357451    S.D. dependent var 2.950922 
S.E. of regression 2.365433    Akaike info criterion 4.700438 
Sum squared resid 61.54801    Schwarz criterion 4.787353 
Log likelihood -28.55284    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.682573 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.366855    
     
     
Table 17: Environmental Performance Index 
 
The quality of the natural environment as measured by EPI appears to be well related to the 
intangible wealth. Environmental amenities are consequently an important component of the 
Moroccan wealth. 
4. Peace 
According to The Fund for Peace (2014), the failed state index or also called fragile state 
index measures the stability of a country though political stability, the strength of the 
legitimate authority, availability of public services and relation with other countries.  
 
Dependent Variable: P__STABILITY  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/12/14   Time: 12:46   
Sample (adjusted): 2 18   
Included observations: 17 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     PS_1 0.921282 0.115879 7.950355 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.378152    Mean dependent var -0.329914 
Adjusted R-squared 0.378152    S.D. dependent var 0.235882 
S.E. of regression 0.186010    Akaike info criterion -0.469011 
Sum squared resid 0.553595    Schwarz criterion -0.419999 
Log likelihood 4.986597    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.464139 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.640682    
     
     
Table 18: Political Stability 
Dependent Variable: W1   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/12/14   Time: 15:45   
Sample (adjusted): 2009 2013   
Included observations: 5 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     FAILED_STATE 0.305223 0.225791 1.351794 0.4055 
FS1 2.142175 0.412850 5.188744 0.1212 
     
     R-squared 0.998464    Mean dependent var 20.44683 
Adjusted R-squared 0.993857    S.D. dependent var 2.831585 
S.E. of regression 0.221929    Akaike info criterion -0.182352 
Sum squared resid 0.049253    Schwarz criterion -0.494802 
Log likelihood 4.455880    Hannan-Quinn criter. -1.020936 
Durbin-Watson stat 3.521241    
     
     
Table 19: Failed State Index 
This result is confirmed using the safety and security index from Legatum. The 
Legatum prosperity index is developed by the Legatum Institute (2014) and gathers eight sub-
indexes: Economy, Entrepreneurship & Opportunity, Governance, Education, Health, Safety 
and Security, Personal Freedom and Social Capital. This latter is an annual index based on 89 
variables over 140 countries and takes into consideration a variety of elements like the 
economic growth, education, well-being and quality of life. The current study uses three of 
the sub-indices mentioned above.  It includes Social Capital that measures the social 
involvement of individuals in the social welfare of a nation. It measures the participation in 
volunteer work, donate for charity and help strangers. This sub-index includes also the trust in 
family members and trust in general. It also accounts for Personal Freedom (This sub-index 
includes economic freedom, the freedom in religion and speech, the freedom of choice and 
tolerance toward immigrants and minorities). In addition, Safety and Security as a sub-index 
measuring the national and personal safety based on factors like the fear of crime and the 
personal safety by gender. It also includes fear from the political system and the freedom of 
political expression, the mental health and wellbeing. 
Only one sub-component that is safety-security appears to be statistically significant in 
relation to the first difference of the intangible wealth series. The results are introduced in 
table 20. 
Dependent Variable: DW   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/22/14   Time: 14:08   
Sample (adjusted): 2009 2013   
Included observations: 5 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SAFETY___SECURITY 41.56921 7.015448 5.925383 0.0273 
SOCIAL_CAP_ -6.700606 4.522685 -1.481555 0.2766 
PERSONAL_FREED_ -6.628033 6.389775 -1.037287 0.4086 
     
     R-squared 0.269659    Mean dependent var -38.71661 
Adjusted R-squared -0.460681    S.D. dependent var 4.965953 
S.E. of regression 6.001783    Akaike info criterion 6.705700 
Sum squared resid 72.04280    Schwarz criterion 6.471362 
Log likelihood -13.76425    Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.076762 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.967258    
     
     
Table 20: Legatum Indices 
 
5. Culture 
According to the Bertelsmann Stiftung website (2014), the Status index is part of the 
Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI). This latter evaluates how the developing 
countries and those in transition are directing their efforts for democracy and economic 
changes. On the other hand, the status index measures the political and economic 
transformation degrees. This index defines the position of each country on their path toward 
democracy. 
Dependent Variable: WEALTH   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/12/14   Time: 14:17   
Sample (adjusted): 2003 2012   
Included observations: 5 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     STATUS_IND_ 4.702501 0.313529 14.99863 0.0001 
     
     R-squared 0.167610    Mean dependent var 22.05136 
Adjusted R-squared 0.167610    S.D. dependent var 3.609808 
S.E. of regression 3.293424    Akaike info criterion 5.398589 
Sum squared resid 43.38656    Schwarz criterion 5.320476 
Log likelihood -12.49647    Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.188943 
Durbin Watson                                          1.7899   
     
     
Table 21: Status Index from The Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index (BTI)  
Given the reduced length of the time series, only partial tests have been performed. 
But, these tests appear to be conclusive for the likely variables that are connected with the 
intangible wealth as measured by the residual method. The components of wealth that are 
tested and that show interesting links are governance, knowledge, peace and environmental 
performance. The cultural dimension represented by individual status appear also to be related 
to intangible wealth.  The policy implications of these results are clearly indicating that more 
openness, democratization besides education and access to knowledge lead to higher 
intangible and thus total wealth for Morocco.  
Conclusion 
The results attained in this article are consistent with previous literature on other 
countries. They open the road to further transformations to be tackled around education and 
knowledge besides governance, peacefulness and security with cultural components that 
account for the valuation of the individuals and groups in the economy. But longer time series 
data are needed to perfect the analysis.  
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 APPENDIX I: THE DATA 
 
 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Wealth 10.966 12.363 13.209 18.766 17.477 17.885 23.925 23.257 24.179 24.168 24.837 25.641 25.078 21.151 22.845 22.982 18.952 16.304 17.934  
CPI    3.700 4.100 4.700  3.700 3.300 3.200 3.200 3.200 3.500 3.500 3.300 3.400 3.400 37.000 37.000 39.000 
KEI 4.170     3.740       3.300 3.450    3.610   
KI 4.030     3.330        3.330    3.250   
AYS 2.660 2.660 2.660 2.660 2.660 3.260 3.260 3.260 3.260 3.260 3.790 3.790 3.790 3.790 3.790 4.240 4.240 4.240 4.240 4.240 
EPI      42.966 43.637 44.166 44.872 45.066 44.740 45.074 45.259 45.466 46.154 45.757 45.760 45.760 51.890 51.890 
Failed State            76.500 76.000 75.800 77.100 77.000 76.300 76.100 74.300 74.400 
GII             2.230 2.760 2.740 2.760 28.730 30.700 30.900 32.200 
Trust             27.400        
Voice Acc. -0.359 -0.359 -0.186 -0.186 -0.467 -0.467 -0.516 -0.516 -0.838 -0.546 -0.732 -0.728 -0.733 -0.789 -0.778 -0.728 -0.736 -0.629 -0.722  
P. Stability -0.293 -0.293 0.214 0.214 -0.165 -0.165 -0.348 -0.348 -0.420 -0.305 -0.548 -0.475 -0.511 -0.600 -0.410 -0.383 -0.395 -0.462 -0.500  
Gov. Effectiv -0.033 -0.033 0.027 0.027 -0.031 -0.031 -0.139 -0.139 -0.101 -0.079 -0.259 -0.143 -0.163 -0.174 -0.131 -0.091 -0.127 -0.045 -0.073  
Reg. Quality -0.174 -0.174 -0.061 -0.061 -0.055 -0.055 -0.158 -0.158 -0.270 -0.234 -0.405 -0.177 -0.197 -0.183 -0.048 -0.068 -0.106 -0.092 -0.169  
Rule of Law 0.239 0.239 0.240 0.240 0.144 0.144 -0.011 -0.011 -0.053 0.017 -0.122 -0.253 -0.262 -0.288 -0.192 -0.157 -0.215 -0.206 -0.248  
Cont. Corrupt. 0.327 0.327 0.409 0.409 -0.028 -0.028 -0.176 -0.176 -0.210 -0.081 -0.298 -0.404 -0.323 -0.380 -0.309 -0.175 -0.397 -0.437 -0.356  
Status Ind.         5.210   4.620  4.650  4.470  4.500  4.520 
HDI 0.557  0.582   0.526  0.600   0.569 0.648 0.654 0.588  0.603 0.612 0.614 0.617  
Glob. Peace Index              1.820 1.856 1.850 1.848 1.889 1.897 1.915 
Social Cap.               0.80 2.53 2.35 1.09 -0.97 -0.98 
Personal Freed.               -1.080 -2.540 -2.970 -1.050 -0.869 -1.470 
Safety & Security               -1.100 -0.870 -1.050 -0.910 -1.143 -0.646 
APPENDIX II: CORRELATIONS 
 
 
 
CPI KEI KI AYS EPI Failed State GII Voice Acc. 
CPI Corrélation de Pearson 1 ,327 -1,000* ,522* ,793** -,766* ,808* -,065 
Sig. (bilatérale)  ,673 ,020 ,038 ,001 ,016 ,015 ,817 
N 16 4 3 16 14 9 8 15 
KEI Corrélation de Pearson ,327 1 ,916 -,805 -,634 ,345 ,883 ,929* 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,673  ,084 ,101 ,366 ,776 ,311 ,022 
N 4 5 4 5 4 3 3 5 
KI Corrélation de Pearson -1,000* ,916 1 -,856 -,581 -1,000** -1,000** ,713 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,020 ,084  ,144 ,606 . . ,287 
N 3 4 4 4 3 2 2 4 
AYS Corrélation de Pearson ,522* -,805 -,856 1 ,659** -,384 ,776* -,810** 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,038 ,101 ,144  ,008 ,307 ,024 ,000 
N 16 5 4 20 15 9 8 19 
EPI Corrélation de Pearson ,793** -,634 -,581 ,659** 1 -,871** ,624 -,412 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,001 ,366 ,606 ,008  ,002 ,098 ,144 
N 14 4 3 15 15 9 8 14 
Failed State Corrélation de Pearson -,766* ,345 -1,000** -,384 -,871** 1 -,641 -,144 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,016 ,776 . ,307 ,002  ,087 ,734 
N 9 3 2 9 9 9 8 8 
GII Corrélation de Pearson ,808* ,883 -1,000** ,776* ,624 -,641 1 ,643 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,015 ,311 . ,024 ,098 ,087  ,119 
N 8 3 2 8 8 8 8 7 
Voice Acc. Corrélation de Pearson -,065 ,929* ,713 -,810** -,412 -,144 ,643 1 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,817 ,022 ,287 ,000 ,144 ,734 ,119  
N 15 5 4 19 14 8 7 19 
P. Stability Corrélation de Pearson -,216 ,679 ,322 -,711** -,433 ,561 ,149 ,876** 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,440 ,208 ,678 ,001 ,122 ,148 ,750 ,000 
N 15 5 4 19 14 8 7 19 
Gov. Effectiv Corrélation de Pearson ,275 ,781 ,321 -,563* ,160 -,216 ,678 ,757** 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,321 ,119 ,679 ,012 ,584 ,608 ,094 ,000 
N 15 5 4 19 14 8 7 19 
Reg. Quality Corrélation de Pearson ,104 ,201 -,529 -,116 ,040 ,612 ,015 ,382 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,712 ,746 ,471 ,636 ,893 ,107 ,975 ,106 
N 15 5 4 19 14 8 7 19 
Rule of Law Corrélation de Pearson -,290 ,902* ,710 -,918** -,562* ,569 ,023 ,900** 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,295 ,037 ,290 ,000 ,036 ,141 ,961 ,000 
N 15 5 4 19 14 8 7 19 
Status Ind. Corrélation de Pearson -,423 -1,000** 1,000** -,938** -,356 -,070 -,360 -,781 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,403 . . ,006 ,489 ,911 ,640 ,119 
N 6 2 2 6 6 5 4 5 
HDI Corrélation de Pearson ,156 -,695 -,321 ,537 ,368 ,046 -,026 -,523 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,667 ,193 ,679 ,072 ,295 ,922 ,961 ,081 
N 10 5 4 12 10 7 6 12 
Cont. Corrupt. Corrélation de Pearson -,325 ,891* ,887 -,871** -,462 ,369 -,628 ,908** 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,237 ,043 ,113 ,000 ,097 ,368 ,131 ,000 
N 15 5 4 19 14 8 7 19 
Glob. Peace 
Index 
Corrélation de Pearson ,918** 1,000** -1,000** ,612 ,798* -,665 ,765* ,718 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,004 . . ,144 ,031 ,103 ,045 ,108 
N 7 2 2 7 7 7 7 6 
Social Cap. Corrélation de Pearson -,786 .a .a ,001 -,911* ,851* -,489 -,034 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,064 . . ,999 ,011 ,031 ,325 ,957 
N 6 1 1 6 6 6 6 5 
Personal Freed. Corrélation de Pearson ,655 .a .a -,325 ,459 -,409 ,177 ,227 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,158 . . ,529 ,360 ,420 ,738 ,714 
N 6 1 1 6 6 6 6 5 
Safety & 
Security 
Corrélation de Pearson ,347 .a .a ,390 ,230 -,238 ,180 ,545 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,500 . . ,445 ,661 ,649 ,733 ,342 
N 6 1 1 6 6 6 6 5 
  
 
P. Stability Gov. Effectiv Reg. Quality Rule of Law Status Ind. HDI Cont. Corrupt. 
CPI Corrélation de Pearson -,216 ,275 ,104 -,290 -,423 ,156 -,325 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,440 ,321 ,712 ,295 ,403 ,667 ,237 
N 15 15 15 15 6 10 15 
KEI Corrélation de Pearson ,679 ,781 ,201 ,902* -1,000** -,695 ,891* 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,208 ,119 ,746 ,037 . ,193 ,043 
N 5 5 5 5 2 5 5 
KI Corrélation de Pearson ,322 ,321 -,529 ,710 1,000** -,321 ,887 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,678 ,679 ,471 ,290 . ,679 ,113 
N 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 
AYS Corrélation de Pearson -,711** -,563* -,116 -,918** -,938** ,537 -,871** 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,001 ,012 ,636 ,000 ,006 ,072 ,000 
N 19 19 19 19 6 12 19 
EPI Corrélation de Pearson -,433 ,160 ,040 -,562* -,356 ,368 -,462 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,122 ,584 ,893 ,036 ,489 ,295 ,097 
N 14 14 14 14 6 10 14 
Failed State Corrélation de Pearson ,561 -,216 ,612 ,569 -,070 ,046 ,369 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,148 ,608 ,107 ,141 ,911 ,922 ,368 
N 8 8 8 8 5 7 8 
GII Corrélation de Pearson ,149 ,678 ,015 ,023 -,360 -,026 -,628 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,750 ,094 ,975 ,961 ,640 ,961 ,131 
N 7 7 7 7 4 6 7 
Voice Acc. Corrélation de Pearson ,876** ,757** ,382 ,900** -,781 -,523 ,908** 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,000 ,000 ,106 ,000 ,119 ,081 ,000 
N 19 19 19 19 5 12 19 
P. Stability Corrélation de Pearson 1 ,796** ,530* ,805** ,110 -,424 ,829** 
Sig. (bilatérale)  ,000 ,020 ,000 ,861 ,169 ,000 
N 19 19 19 19 5 12 19 
Gov. Effectiv Corrélation de Pearson ,796** 1 ,656** ,709** -,122 -,291 ,730** 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,000  ,002 ,001 ,845 ,359 ,000 
N 19 19 19 19 5 12 19 
Reg. Quality Corrélation de Pearson ,530* ,656** 1 ,234 -,912* -,052 ,256 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,020 ,002  ,335 ,031 ,872 ,290 
N 19 19 19 19 5 12 19 
Rule of Law Corrélation de Pearson ,805** ,709** ,234 1 ,682 -,723** ,941** 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,000 ,001 ,335  ,205 ,008 ,000 
N 19 19 19 19 5 12 19 
Status Ind. Corrélation de Pearson ,110 -,122 -,912* ,682 1 ,102 ,387 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,861 ,845 ,031 ,205  ,898 ,520 
N 5 5 5 5 6 4 5 
HDI Corrélation de Pearson -,424 -,291 -,052 -,723** ,102 1 -,574 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,169 ,359 ,872 ,008 ,898  ,051 
N 12 12 12 12 4 12 12 
Cont. Corrupt. Corrélation de Pearson ,829** ,730** ,256 ,941** ,387 -,574 1 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,000 ,000 ,290 ,000 ,520 ,051  
N 19 19 19 19 5 12 19 
Glob. Peace 
Index 
Corrélation de Pearson ,196 ,892* ,067 ,202 -,580 ,880* -,219 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,709 ,017 ,900 ,701 ,420 ,049 ,677 
N 6 6 6 6 4 5 6 
Social Cap. Corrélation de Pearson ,898* -,333 ,634 ,750 -,976 -,787 ,328 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,038 ,584 ,251 ,144 ,139 ,213 ,590 
N 5 5 5 5 3 4 5 
Personal Freed. Corrélation de Pearson -,784 ,455 -,220 -,430 ,774 ,666 -,310 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,117 ,441 ,722 ,470 ,436 ,334 ,612 
N 5 5 5 5 3 4 5 
Safety & 
Security 
Corrélation de Pearson ,402 ,421 ,458 ,737 ,711 -,741 ,315 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,503 ,480 ,437 ,155 ,496 ,259 ,606 
N 5 5 5 5 3 4 5 
  Glob. Peace Index Social Cap. Personal Freed. Safety & Security 
CPI Corrélation de Pearson ,918** -,786 ,655 ,347 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,004 ,064 ,158 ,500 
N 7 6 6 6 
KEI Corrélation de Pearson 1,000** .a .a .a 
Sig. (bilatérale) . . . . 
N 2 1 1 1 
KI Corrélation de Pearson -1,000** .a .a .a 
Sig. (bilatérale) . . . . 
N 2 1 1 1 
AYS Corrélation de Pearson ,612 ,001 -,325 ,390 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,144 ,999 ,529 ,445 
N 7 6 6 6 
EPI Corrélation de Pearson ,798* -,911* ,459 ,230 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,031 ,011 ,360 ,661 
N 7 6 6 6 
Failed State Corrélation de Pearson -,665 ,851* -,409 -,238 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,103 ,031 ,420 ,649 
N 7 6 6 6 
GII Corrélation de Pearson ,765* -,489 ,177 ,180 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,045 ,325 ,738 ,733 
N 7 6 6 6 
Voice Acc. Corrélation de Pearson ,718 -,034 ,227 ,545 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,108 ,957 ,714 ,342 
N 6 5 5 5 
P. Stability Corrélation de Pearson ,196 ,898* -,784 ,402 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,709 ,038 ,117 ,503 
N 6 5 5 5 
Gov. Effectiv Corrélation de Pearson ,892* -,333 ,455 ,421 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,017 ,584 ,441 ,480 
N 6 5 5 5 
Reg. Quality Corrélation de Pearson ,067 ,634 -,220 ,458 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,900 ,251 ,722 ,437 
N 6 5 5 5 
Rule of Law Corrélation de Pearson ,202 ,750 -,430 ,737 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,701 ,144 ,470 ,155 
N 6 5 5 5 
Status Ind. Corrélation de Pearson -,580 -,976 ,774 ,711 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,420 ,139 ,436 ,496 
N 4 3 3 3 
HDI Corrélation de Pearson ,880* -,787 ,666 -,741 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,049 ,213 ,334 ,259 
N 5 4 4 4 
Cont. Corrupt. Corrélation de Pearson -,219 ,328 -,310 ,315 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,677 ,590 ,612 ,606 
N 6 5 5 5 
Glob. Peace 
Index 
Corrélation de Pearson 1 -,882* ,644 ,462 
Sig. (bilatérale)  ,020 ,168 ,356 
N 7 6 6 6 
Social Cap. Corrélation de Pearson -,882* 1 -,758 -,144 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,020  ,081 ,786 
N 6 6 6 6 
Personal Freed. Corrélation de Pearson ,644 -,758 1 -,120 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,168 ,081  ,821 
N 6 6 6 6 
Safety & 
Security 
Corrélation de Pearson ,462 -,144 -,120 1 
Sig. (bilatérale) ,356 ,786 ,821  
N 6 6 6 6 
*. Correlation significant at  0.05 
**.  Correlation significant at  0.01 
a. No result  
